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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Ii
VOLUME XIII NOVEMBER, 1944 NUMBER 2
SOME TAX EFFECTS OF CANCELLATION OF
INDEBTEDNESS
JOSEPH B. LYNCHt
IN 1940 three excellent Law Review articles' appeared on the subject
of this paper.2 The authors made scholarly and comprehensive sur-
veys of the question,, undertook to interpret some perplexing decisions,
and critically analyzed the then recently enacted tax legislation specific-
ally designed to facilitate corporate debt adjustments. It was the unani-
mous judgment of the authors that the status of the subject was quite
unsatisfactory. Professor Warren and Mr. Sugarman complained that
the courts and the legislature had "added confusion and chaos in a field
of law which for many years has been in need of clarification."' In
the intervening period there have been important developments. New
lines were hewn by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. American Dental
Co.' and deepened by a host of decisions interpreting and applying its
doctrine, while in the Congressional field the Chandler Act amendment
t Member of the New York Bar. &
In this article.the following abbreviated citations will be used: Decisions of the Board
of Tax Appeals will be cited as B.T.A. Decisions of the Tax Court (formerly Board of
Tax Appeals) will be cited as T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. refers to docket number of a Memo-
randum Opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals or the Tax Court. Acquiescence of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals or the Tax
Court will be cited as A. Non-acquiescence will be cited as N.A. Internal Revenue Bulle-
tins will be cited as I.R.B. and Cumulative Bulletins of the Internal Revenue Bureau will
be cited as C.B. Internal Revenue Code will be cited as I.R.C. U. S. Tax Cases will' be
cited as U.S.T.C.
1. Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax (1940) 53 HARV.
L. REv. 977; Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment of Can-
cellation of Indebtedness (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1153; Warren and Sugarman, Cancellation
of Indebtedness and Its Tax Consequences (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1326.
2. The worth of these articles has been attested by frequent citation. In Helvering
v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322, 63 Sup. Ct. 577 (1943), for example, they were
cited in the briefs of both petitioper and respondent as well as in the opinion of the Court.
3. Warren and Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1326.
4. 318 U. S. 322, 63 Sup. Ct. 577 (1943).
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of 1940, the Revenue Act of 1942 and the Revenue Act of 1943 have
provided an acceptable solution in a substantial number of debt adjust-
ment situations. Nevertheless what the Supreme Court in the Dental/
case, speaking of the fax effect of the remission of indebtedness, called
"uncertainties" in 1940, the Tax Court in 1944 still classifies in the
"vexed category of controverted gain".5 Accordingly, it appeared that
an article which would have for its purpose, not a recanvassing of the
entire subject, but, rather, a review of some of the more recent develop-
ments, might serve a useful purpose.
From United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.' came the basic principle
that an increase in net assets resulting from a complete or partial cancel-
lation of indebtedness constitutes "gross income".7 Exceptions to the
Kirby doctrine immediately developed. The Tax Court has observed
that not only was Sec. 68 of the Chandler Act "an obvious legislative
effort to release 77B reorganizations from the tax burden of the Kirby
case", but that "some courts have devised a formula for lifting certain
types of -debt adjustment out of the Kirby case."' The several excep-
tions now encompass so many debt adjustment cases as drastically to
limit the application of the fundamental rule. Three exceptions are
traceable directly to the judicial concept of "gross income", as defined
in Code Sec. 22(a):
1. No income is realized upon cancellation of indebtedness if the
borrowed funds have been lost.
2. No income is realized if the cancellation constitutes an adjustment
of purchase price.
3. No income is realized if stock of the debtor is issued in exchange
for debt or if there is a mere substitution of bonds for bonds.
A further exception rests upon the applicability to the gratuitous forgive-
ness of indebtedness of Code Sec. 22 (b) (3) exempting gifts from income
taxation. Additibnal exceptions stem from statutory provisions specific-
ally relating to the income tax effects of debt adjustments-the Chandler
Act, as amended, and Code Sections 22(b)(9) and 22(b)(10).
5. Kramon Development Co., Inc., 3 T.C. 342 (1944), A. I.R.B. 1944-11, 1.
6. 284 U.S. 1, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931).
7. The definition of "gross income" in the Revenue Act which was under consideration
by the Court was substantially the same as that of I.R.C. § 22(a), 53 STAT. 875, 876,
26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (1939). '
8. Claridge Apartments Co., 1 T.C. 163 (1942), rev'd in part, 138 F. (2d) 962 (C.CA.
7th, 1943), rev'd, - U.S. - (Dec. 4, 1944).
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In each of the foregoing categories some recent refinements or varia-
tions of the original rule have been supplied by the courts or Congress.9
GENERAL RULE
The first essential to the Kirby rule, under which a purchase by a
taxpayer of its own obligations at a discount creates taxable income
through the resulting increase in net assets, is that the obligation' be one
personal to the taxpayer. A lien on a taxpayer's property for which he
is not liable is not such an obligation, and, therefore, its discharge for
less than face amount does not give rise to taxable gain. Accordingly,
where real estate was purchased subject to delinquent tax assessments
which the purchaser did not assume and was under no personal obliga-
tion to pay, and which later were discharged at a substantial discount,
the transaction was held to adjust cost but not to result in taxable
income.10
The next essential is that the taxpayer's obligation be absolute and
not contingent. A parent corporation, for example, which has guaranteed
the bonds of its subsidiary, .realizes no income through a mere discharge
of the guaranty. As was stated by the Second Circuit,' "the obligation
to be retired must be one which unconditionally subjects the obligor's
assets to liability for the payment of a fixed amount." There it was held
that the corporation's purchase at a discount of bonds issued by it re-
sulted in no taxable income because, even though its stockholders were
unconditionally bound to pay the bonds, they were contingent and not
absolute obligations of the taxpayer corporation. Similarly, the Tax
Court has held' 2 that where certain scrip certificates had given rise to
no charge upon the taxpayer's corporate assets when issued, and no
charge subsequently arose therefrom, a surrender of the certificates to
9. There are other well grounded exceptions, e.g., that no income is realized on the
repurchase of obligations issued without the receipt of money or property. Commissioner
v. Rail joint Company, 61 F. (2d) 751 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932). But where there have been
no recent noteworthy developments, no attempt has been made in this paper to retread
the ground.
10. Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940), A. 1940-2 C.B. 4. The discharge was
effected through the surrender of municipal bonds which were acceptable at par in pay-
ment of taxes. They were purchased at a large discount for this specific purpose. There
was no evidence that at the time of surrender their market value exceeded cost.
11. Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v. Commissioner, 130 F. (2d)
141 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942). It may be noted that the corporation had no actual stockholders
but the Court assumed that its "adhering producers" might be regarded as such.
12. Terminal Investment Co., 2 T.C. 1004 (1943), A. I.R.B. 1944-5, 1.
1944]
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the taxpayer did not increase the latter's assets, and, therefore, pro-
duced no income.
Thirdly, the Kirby rule has no application in the case of performance
of a contract of purchase and sale in accordance with its terms. Thus,
where a taxpayer agrees to "purchase or cause to be purchased" certain
assets at a specified price, and thereupon causes a controlled corporation
to make the purchase, ,the Kirby rule does not require the conclusion
that such satisfaction of the taxpayer's obligation constitutes either
dividend or any other form of income. In such a case the taxpayer
has simply done what he contracted to do, namely, to purchase or pro-
cure a purchaser. 3 Again, where a taxpayer purchased property for a
consideration represented by a note, and the deed recited that it would
become absolute only when the purchase price was fully paid, and the
parties had an understanding reached during the negotiations that if
the note were prepaid a substantial discbunt would be allowed, there
was merely an execution of the purchase contract and no income was
'realized upon payment of a lesser sum and the surrender of the note. 4
Here, again, there was merely performance of an executory contract.
And where a taxpayer acquired property, and pursuant to the contract
of purchase, assumed certain mortgage indebtedness, and the contract
provided that that indebtedness might be satisfied by transferring at face
value mortgage certificates issued by the creditor, and the taxpayer
acquired such mortgage certificates at a discount and transferred them
to the creditor, no income was realized.' In this case, however, the value
of the property did not exceed the cost of the mortgage certificates. Of
course, the rule as to performance of an executory contract of purchase
and sale has no application in the case of the payment of a debt to a
third party; for instance, if a taxpayer purchases property and later,
on the security of the property, borrows money from a third party under
an agreement whereby the debt may be paid off at less than par, no
situation is presented to which the executory contract rule can be applied.
Thus, where long after acquisition of property by the taxpayer, a corpo-
ration other than the seller issued certificates in respect of a mortgage
made by the taxpayer, and authorized the latter to pay down the mort-
gage by surrender of such certificates at face, and the taxpayer acquired
such certificates dealt in on the market, at a discount and so surrendered
them, there was no performance of a contract of purchase and sale and,
13. S. K. Ames, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1020 (1942), A. 1942-1 C.B. 1.
14. Pinkney Packing Co., 42 B.T.A. 823 (1940), A. 1941-1 C.B. 8.
15. Cherokee Co., 41 B.T.A. 1212 (1940), A. 1940-2 C.B. 2.
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under the Kirby doctrine, taxable gain resulted."6
In the Kirby case, the bonds, the purchase of which gave rise to
ilucome, had been issued at par for cash. What the rule is for the deter-
mination of gain or loss on the reacquisition of obligations issued for
property worth less than the face amount of the bonds is somewhat
uncertain. 7 An issue of bonds for assets having a value of less than the
face of the bonds has been treated by the Third Circuit 8 as an issue at
a discount, but the question in that case related, not to gain or loss on
retirement of bonds, but to annual amortization of discount during the
life of the bonds. The Court observed that even the discount question
had "not been squarely decided previously by court decision". In a
case in which $50,000,000 of debentures had been issued and the Board
had treated as a consideration therefor a monopoly of "great value"
granted to the taxpayer, and the bonds were later repurchased at less
than par, the Second Circuit doubted whether the Board's decision that
profit was thereby realized could be sustained "without a finding that
the monopoly was worth as much as the face of the taxpayer's deben-
tures". 19 However, the Circuit Court did not find it necessary specifically
to pass upon the point. The Tax Court has also stressed issue price
rather than par value, and this seems to. be the better view.2" To the
contrary it may be argued that a solvent taxpayer who issues $100 of
obligations in payment of property worth less than $100, and later, while
still solvent, reacquires the obligations at less than $100, increases his
net assets by the difference and thereby realizes taxable income.i The
Tax Court has recently recognized that the question "perhaps remains
open".21
Can the effect of the Kirby rule, under which a corporation which
purchased its own bonds at a discount would be taxable on the amount
16. Fifth Avenue-14th Street Corporation, 2 T.C. 516 (1943), on appeal - F. (2d) -
(C.C.A. 2d).
17. In Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 54 Sup. Ct. 460 (1934), the
bonds had been assumed upon the purchase of assets the nature of which did not appear,
and in Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. (2d) 104 (C.C.A. 1st,
1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 595 (1934), the notes were issued in part payment of property
worth in excess of the face of the notes.
18. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, 130 F. (2d) 883 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1942).
19. Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v. Commissioner, 130 F. (2d)
141 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
20. In any event, proper account must be taken of unamortized peremium or expense.
21. Kramon Development Co., Inc., 3 T.C. 342 (1944).
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of the discount, be avoided by having a subsidiary or affliated corpora-
tion make the purchase?2 s Can a corporation thus effect indirectly a
tax saving which it could not accomplish directly? Commissioner v.
Capento Securities Corporations involved a corporation organized for
the specific purpose of purchasing at a discount the bonds of an affiliate
which in a later year issued preferred stock in exchange. The Court
said it did not have to decide whether "the principle of the Kirby
Lumber case could be extended to nullify this tax-avoiding device", as
only the later year was under review. If the corporations did not file a
consolidated return, no income should be held to result from the trans-
action. There is nothing in the Gregory case2i or the line of decisions
which followed in its wake, laying heavy emphasis upon the necessity
of a business purpose, to force a conclusion that the transaction was tax-
able, assuming that the purchasing corporation, unlike that in the Gregory
case, was not immediately dissolved but continued a normal existence.
Certainly, if a corporation which was a going business concern made
the purchase it does not seem that the Gregbry doctrine could success-
fully be invokd'to render the transaction taxable. 5
The corollary of the Kirby rule, first recognized in the Dallas case, 26
that where an insolvent debtQr conveys property to his creditors, or
any of them, in full or partial satisfaction of his obligations, no taxable
gain results if the debtor remains insolvent after the transfer,27 and the
further corollary, first somewhat weakly advanced in Lakeland Grocery
Company,28 that where an insolvent debtor in such a transaction becomes
solvent he realizes taxable gain to the extent by which the transaction
renders him solvent, may now be considered quite firmly established. 9
22. In any event, under I.R.C. § 22(b)(9) 53 STAT. 875, 876, 26 U.S.C.A. 22(b)(9)
(1935), the corporation could not avoid present gain at the price of a decrease in the
tax basis.
23. 140 F. (2d) 382 (C.C.A. 1st, 1944).
24. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U:S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935).
25. See in this connection PAUL, STUDIES ix FEDERAL TA:-.ATION (3d series, 1940) 121-134.
26. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 95 (C.C.A.
5th, 1934).
27. 250 West 35th Street Corp., T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 2535, August 10, 1944.
28. 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937). Two dissenting members thought the full amount of the
cancelled debt was taxable while four other dissenters thought that no part of the debt
cancelled was taxable.
29. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 285 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941), cert. denied 314
U.S. 622 (1941), which, however, in so far as it held a gratuitous debt cancellation not
to be a gift, was apparently overruled in the Dental case.
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BORROWED MONEY LOST
Few tax decisions of the Supreme Court have evoked more unfavorable
comment than the Kerbaugh-Empire case.30 Writing in 1936, Mr. Magill
was quite critical.3 ' Professor Warren and Mr. Sugarman applied to it
such terms as "no longer a controlling precedent in this field" and
"generally discredited"; 32 Mr. Surrey thought that the decision's reliance
on the loss of the money borrowed had "generally been regarded as com-
pletely discredited by the later decisions." The criticism was princi-
pally directed to the fact that the Court dovetailed into a single business
deal what normally would have been considered two separate trans-
actions: (1) the debt transaction consisting of the borrowing of the
funds and their repayment, and (2) the construction transaction financed
through the proceeds of the loan. The separateness of each was accentu-
ated by the circumstance that the construction loss occurred in years
prior to the completion of the loan transaction and was sustained by
another taxable entity, the taxpayer's subsidiary. The Kerbaugh-Empire
decision was originally interpreted to stand for either of two propositions:
(1) that a liquidation of a money" obligation for less than the amount
received does not result in income, or (2) that if one phase of a trans-
action results in a loss and in a later year another phase of the same
transaction results in a counter-balancing profit, -no income is realized.
But in the Kirby case34 a liquidation of a money obligation for less
than the amount received thereon was held to constitute income, a result
squarely contrary to the first proposition, while in the Sanford & Brooks
case33 in which one phase of the transaction had resulted in losses in
prior years and another in a recovery in the taxable year, the recovery
was held to be taxable, thus negativing the second proposition. The
30. 271 U.S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct. 449 (1926). The taxpayer had borrowed money relpay-
able in German marks or their gold equivalent, had subsequently, through a subsidiary,
lost in business the money borrowed, and had repaid the loan when marks had greatly
depreciated, but not 'to the extent of the losses sustained. Pointing out that the excess
of the subsidiary's losses over its income exceeded the amount borrowed, the Court held
that the difference due to the depreciation of the mark between the amount borrowed and
the amount repaid was not income.
31. MAGiLL, TAxABLE INco (1936) 215 et seq. See also Rottschaefer, The Concept
of Income in Federal Taxation (1921) 13 Mmi. L. Rnv. 637, 661. Professor Rottschaefer
considered the Court's reasoning "inadequate and inaccurate".
32. Warren & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1329.
33. Surrey, supra note 1, at 1169.
34. 284 U.S. 1, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931).
35. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931).
151 •
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logic of this analysis when made seemed quite irresistible. At this date,
a better perspective of the case can be hadY6
The Kirby case did not overrule the Kerbaugh-Empire case. At most,
its effect was to hold that the Kerbaugh-Empire doctrine had no appli-
cation to a situation in which there was no showing as to the disposition
of the borrowed funds. Nor did the Sanjord & Brooks case overrule the
Kerbaugh-Empire case. At most, it indicated that the latter's application
was limited to debt adjustment transactions. In the Sanjord & Brooks
case there was no occasion for the Court to determine whether in the year
involved the taxpayer had received the equivalent of cash, for the simple
reason that in that year it had actually received the cash representing
the proceeds of the judgment. The only question was whether the losses
for prior years arising from the transaction could be offset against the-
recovery by the taxpayer in the taxable year. The Court held that they
could not. In the Kerbaugh-Empire case no cash or property had been
received, but the corporation's liabilities had been reduced and it was
incumbent upon the Court to determine whether, through such reduc-
tion, the equivalent of cash had been realized. To do this the Court
deemed it proper to view in its entirety the transaction out of which
the supposed income arose. If the loan only were looked to, the financial
position of the taxpayer was improved, but if account were also taken
of the business done with the proceeds of the loan, there was no such
improvement. As the Supreme Court later said in the Dental case, "the
courts have been astute to avoid taxing every balance sheet improvement
brought about through a debt reduction." Approaching the problem in
this light, and limiting the application to debt adjustment cases, it does
not seem that the Kerbaugh-Empire case is either overruled or dis-
credited. 7 On the contrary, the decision seems to have become the basis
of a further development in the law of income taxation in relation to
debt cancellation.
READ5JUSTMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE
From the Kerbaugh-Empire rule has evolved the "readjustment of
purchase price" theory in debt cancellation cases. It first appeared in a
36. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1942) § 11.20.
37. In a dissenting opinion in Estate of Rogers v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410, 417, 64 Sup.
Ct. 172, 175 (1940), Chief Justice Stone and Justice Roberts wrote: "We have too often
committed ourselves to the proposition that taxation is a practical matter concerned with
substance rather than form, see Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170, . . .to
depart from it now." See also Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 6th,
1943); Frank v. United States, 44 Fed. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa., 1942).
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District Court decision a,8 in which, the Court held that where land was
purchased for $20,000 and later depreciated in value to $6,500, the pay-
ment of $6,500 in cancellation of a $10,000 mortgage note which repre-
sented part of the purchase price resulted in no income. Of this decision
Mr. Surrey thought that at best it stood
"for the proposition that gain is not to be recognized WVhere the value of the
property obtained upon incurrence of the obligation has declined below the
amount of the obligation. This particular situation cannot properly be excepted
from the rule that the realization of income in these cases need not await
the disposal of the property, for that rule necessarily divorces the factors of
basis and value from the realization of income."39
Professor Warren and Mr. Sugarman were equally critical of the decision
and thought that the fact "that the property declined in value should
have no legal effect even though it may have a strong emotional effect."4
But in Hirsch v. Commissioner,41 where property purchased for
$29,000 had shrunk in value to $8,000 at a time when the unpaid pur-
chase price was $15,000, and the seller agreed to a reduction of $7,000,
the Seventh Circuit, in line with the Hexteg decision, held that no
income was realized, on the ground that the transaction "was in its
essence a reduction in purchase price". Next, the Eighth Circuit,4 2 also
in line with the Hextell' decision, held that where property purchased
for $100,000 had depreciated in value to $60,000, the extinguishment
of $20,000 out of an $80,000 purchase money indebtedness did not result
in income for the reason that it was equivalent to a voluntary "reduction
in the purchase price". In both of these cases the taxpayer had previ-
ously offered to reconvey the property to the mortgagee in satisfaction
of the debt. A similar situation was presented in Gehring Publishing
Company, Inc.,43 which was likened by the Tax Court to the Hirsch and
Killian cases, and so decided. In the Dental case, the Supreme Court
cited the Hirsch, Killian and Gehring cases, but made no statement of
the rule of these cases, simply noting:
"Where the indebtedness has represented the purchase price of property, a'
partial forgiveness has been treated as a readjustment of the contract rather
than a gain."
38. Hextell v. Huston, 28 Fed. Supp. 521 (S.D. Iowa, 1939).
39. Surrey, supra note 1, at 1169.
40. Warren and Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1335.
41. '115 F. (2d) 656 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
42. Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F. (2d) 433 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
43. 1 T.C. 345 (1942).
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In Commissioner v. Sherman, et al., Exrs.," where the fair market
value of the property was less than the amount of the mortgage debt, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that no income had been realized on the debt
cancellation. On the other hand, in Fifth Avenue-14th Street Corpora-
tion,45 involving another debt adjustment situation, where 'the record
did not show the value of the property, the Tax Court declined to follow
the Hirsch and Killian cases, stating:
"One of the factors requisite to an application of the doctrine of the Hirsch
and Killian cases is the depreciation in value of the property to a point where
it does not exceed the unpaid balance of the purchase price. '4 6
It is not clear whether by the phrase, "unpaid balance of the purchase
price", the Court meant unpaid balance before, or unpaid balance after,
adjustment.
In Ralph W. Gwinn th6 Tax Court undertook to state the rule of
the Hirsch case, as follows:
"In order to apply the 'readjustment of purchase price' theory of Hirsch v.
Commissioner and its companion cases, it becomes necessary to compare the
value of the purchased property when the reduction in indebtedness occurred
with the figure to which the debt was then reduced. If the amount remaining
due after adjustment continues to be as much as the diminished value of the
property, the necessary elements" for application of the Birsch principle . . .
appear to be furnished.1'47
It may be 'doubted whether the last quoted statement is not too narrow
a construction of the Hirsch rule. No reference is made in the Hirsch
or allied caseg to the necessity of comparing diminished value of property
with debt remaining due after adjustmenzt. An application of the Gwinn
interpretation of the Hirsch doctrine may be shown in the following
illustration: The purchase price of property was $200,000. The property
is now worth $50,000. The remaining purchase money mortgage debt is
$100,000. The seller cancels $60,000 of the debt, thus reducing it to
$40,000, and the purchaser agrees to pay such balance in cash. The
purchaser has thus paid, or agreed to pay,, $140,000 for property worth
44. Supra note 37.
45. 2 T.C. 516 (1943).
46. In Frank v. United States, 44 Fed. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa., 1942), where the prop-
erty owner refinanced a purchase money mortgage with new bonds issued to others than
the sellers, and later reacquired the bonds at a discount, the Court held that the rationale
of the Hirsch, Hextell and Killian cases had no application, and that income resulted from
the transaction.
47. T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 108, 144 (June 9, 1944). Italics supplied.
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$50,000, and in the meantime has effected a cancellation of his obliga-.
tion to pay a further $60,000. If the Gwinn interpretation were correct,
the purchaser, although suffering a loss in value of property of $150,000,
would have realized income of $60,000 from the debt cancellation, since
"the amount remaining due after adjustment", $40,000, does not "con-
tinue(s) to be as much as the diminished value of the property", $50,000.
Nor does the Hirsch case stand, as may be implied from the Fifth
Avenue-14th Street case,48 for the proposition that no income is realized
from the cancellation of debt incurred on the acquisition of property
if the debt remaining due before adjustment continues to be as much
as the diminished value of the property. This might have the effect of
excluding actually realized income. For example, if property were pur-
chased for $100,000, of which $10,000 was paid in cash and $90,000
by mortgage, and the mortgage debt were later reduced through cancella-
tion by $40,000 to $50,000, and the value of the property at the time
of cancellation were $75,000, it would seem that the purchaser had
realized income through the $40,000 debt cancellation, the property'hav-
ing in the meantime diminished in value by only $25,000. Viewing this
transaction as a whole, the financial position of the taxpayer has been
improved by $15,000.
A rule which might come closer to the Kerbaugh-Empire admonition
to consult the "result of the whole transaction", which would accept
the specific statement in the Killian case that the "transaction concern-
ing the purchase of the real estate is viewed in its entirety", and which
would be within the rationale of the Hirsch and companion cases, would
be that a cancellation of debt incurred in the purchase of property results
in income only if and to the extent that the amount of the cancellation
exceeds the amount of diminution in the value of the property between
the date of purchase and the date of the debt cancellation.
STOCK FOR DEBT AND BONDS FOR BONDS
From time to time well established principles in the law of income
taxation are challenged. That a corporation realizes no gain or suffers
no loss upon the issuance of stock in payment of debt or in exchange
for evidences of debt, is surely a well-grounded doctrine. Some doubt
was cast upon it by a Board member in 1939.40 The case presented the
question whether, upon an issuance of stock for bonds and accrued inter-
est, the corporation was entitled to deduct such interest. Having decided
48. 2 T.C. 516 (1943).
49. Hummnel-Ross Fibre Corp., 40 B.T.A. 821, 823 (1939).
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-that it was, the Board member proceeded to observe that the Commis-
sioner had not attempted to tax the issuing corporation upon gain on
the exchange. He then went on to explain that
"though petitioner's satisfaction of the bond and the then accrued interest
obligations, by transfer of its preferred stock, may have resulted in a realized
gain to petitioner in the sum of the difference between the then fair market
value of the stock and the amount of those obligations-the realization of
gain here is immaterial."
In 1942, the Commissioner adopted the suggestion thus offered, and
contended before the Board" and the Circuit Court5 that upon the
original issuance by a corporation of preferred stock of a par value and
actual market value of $50,000 in exchange for its bonds of a face value
of $500,000, the corporation had realized a taxable gain of $450,000.
In disposing of the claim, the Board said:
"The corporation had a liability of $500,000 on the bonds, having presumably
borrowed that amount .... To substitute a capital stock liability for a bonded
indebtedness . . . can not be called a present realization of gain .... Gain is
not realized by a corporation in the receipt of the subscription price of its
shares . . . and this would seem to be no less true when the subscription price,
instead of being newly paid, is the amount which has already been paid in
as the principal of a bond loan."
The Circuit Court affirmed on the basis of the Board's reasoning. Prior
to this decision, there does not seem to be any case which squarely
decided the point.5 2
If the stock issued for the debt is treasury stock, in which the corpo-
ration dealt as it might in shares of another corporation, the rule is
otherwise, and gain or loss, measured by the difference between the cost
of the treasury stock and the amount of debt discharged, is realized. "3
As was originally stated in Great Western Power Company of Cali-
Jornia v. Commissioner,4 the question as to whether, upon an exchange
of one obligation for another, a premium paid by the debtor corporation
is deductible depends upon whether the transaction is a mere exchange
50. Capento Securities Corp., 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942); N.A. 1943 C.B. 28.
51. Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp., 140 F. (2d) 382 (C.C.A. 1st, 1944).
52. In the following cases, stock was issued for bonds, but the question of gain or loss
on issuance did not arise: Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 13 B.T.A. 988 (1928); 375 Park Ave-
nue Corp., 23 B.T.A. 969 (1931); Pierce Oil Corp., 32 B.T.A. 403 (1935); The Liquid
Carbonic Corp., 34 B.T.A. 1191 (1936); Appeal of Howard W. Starr, 1 B.T.A. 681 (1925).
53. A. R. Purdy Co., Inc., T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 2763, October 10, 1944.
54. 297 U.S. 543, 56 Sup. Ct. 576 (1936).
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or is to be viewed "as if the retirement were accomplished by the pay-
ment of cash." Obviously, the same question is presented if a discount
is involved. The answer to the factual inquiry as to whether the trans-
action is one of substitution or one of purchase determines the answer
to the question of gain or loss. In the Great Western Power case, the
facts showed a mere substitution of obligations. On a similar set of facts,
a District Court'5 recently ruled that a premium paid in connection with
an exchange by a corporation of- its old bonds for new was not deducti-
ble, but was required to be spread over the life of the new bonds.
GRATUITOUS FoRGIVEss
The essential facts of the Dental case were these: The taxpayer owed
overdue note interest and back rent. From its creditors it sought and
obtained an adjustment of both. The items involved had been accrued
in prior years and had served fully to offset income. Without any
consideration therefor, the noteholders, who were the taxpayer's cus-
tomers, agreed to cancel part of -the interest, and the lessor agreed upon
receipt of a portion of the rent to cancel the balance. The Commissioner
determined that the forgiveness of the debt was income. Taxpayer
contended, among other things, that the forgiven debts were exempt as
gifts. The Board5 6 found that the cancellations were not gifts, and sus-
tained the Commissioner. The Circuit Court" reversed on the ground
that the cancelled debts were gifts, and the Supreme Court,58 with two
dissenting votes, affirmed.
Before the Board, the taxpayer's principal argument related to book
entries which, it urged, showed that the debts had been actually can-
celled in a prior year. But the 'Board found that the cancellations took
place in the year under review. The taxpayer also contended that the
cancellations actually represented gifts. Said the Board:
"No evidence was introduced to show a donative intent upon the part of any
creditor. The evidence indicates, on the contrary, that the creditors acted for
purely business reasons and did not forgive the debts for altruistic reasons or
out of pure generosity."
The Circuit Court found that there was no consideration to the land-
lord for the cancellation of the rent, and none to the noteholders for
55. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Collector, 52 Fed. Supp. 835 (E.D. Va. 1943).
56. 44 B.T.A. 425 (1941)
57. 128 F. (2d) 254 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942).
58. 318 U.S. 322, 63 Sup. Ct. 577 (1943).
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the cancellation of the interest. As to the latter, the Court said that they
"might have expected more business in the future, but the debtor-taxpayer
did not promise any. Certainly the creditors' expectation was not considera-
tion. The transaction was a pure cancellation of indebtedness, without any
consideration and for the benefit of the debtor."
Therefore, it concluded that the cancellations of the debts represented
gifts. 9 As to the Board's statement of lack of donative intent, the Court
replied:
"Suppose the creditors did act for purely business reasons. As long as there
was no consideration for the cancellation, the intent to give necessarily fol-
lowed. Evidently the Board confused intent with motive. There is no evidence
that the creditors did that which they did not intend to do. The creditors'
motives are immaterial."
No obstacle to the Court's decision was the circumstance" that it might
"result in the Government getting no tax, although the taxpayer had
benefited by deducting the rent and interest accrued."
By way of preparing the foundation for its conclusion, the Supreme
Court pointed, first, to Circuit Court decisions in which the remission
of indebtedness was not treated as resulting in gross income, and then
to the specific statutory enactments in that connection. As to judicial
action, the Court said:
"Possibly because it seems beyond the legislative purpose to exact income taxes
for savings on debts, the courts have been astute to avoid taxing every balance
sheet improvement brought about through a debt reduction."
As to specific legislative relief, the Court referred to the provisions of
the Chandler Act and to Code Sec. 22(b)(9), as added by the Revenue
Act of 1939 and amended by the Revenue Act of 1942. Then the Court
came down to the point, which was simply whether or not the forgive-
ness was a gift under Code Sec. 22 (b) (3). For the purpose of that section
the Court defined the term "gift" as "the receipt of financial advantages
gratuitously." With reference to the Board's statement as to donative
intent first quoted above, the Court said:
"With this conclusion we cannot agree. We do not feel bound by the finding
of the Board because it reached its conclugions, in our opinion, upon an appli-
cation of erroneous legal standards. Section 22(b) (3) exempts gifts .... The
59. In Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 285 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941), the Court had
held a similar cancellation of debt to result in gain to the extent to which the debtor was
thereby made solvent.
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fact that the motives leading to the cancellations were those of business or
even selfish, if it be true, is not .significant. The forgiveness was gratuitous, a
release of something to the debtor for nothing, and sufficient to make the can-
cellation here gifts within the statute."
A few words may be said regarding Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent-
ing opinion. The Justice made three points. The first was that the
particularity with which Congress described the transactions in which
income attributable to the discharge of indebtedness was excluded, ap-
peared to put the Dental situation in a nonexempt category. But the
references to the Chandler Act and Code Sec. 22(b) (9). would seem
to prove either too little or too much-too little, in that what Congress
intended by these provisions relating to discharge of indebtedness has
no bearing on the meaning of gifts within Code Sec. 22 (b) (3) as applied
to forgiveness of debt; too much, in that if the Chandler Act and Code
Sec. 22 (b) (9) are to be the exclusive yardstick for measuring exemption
in debt forgiveness cases, then even the forgiveness of a debt out of "pure
generosity" would constitute taxable income. Secondly, to, the charge of
the Court that the Board reached its conclusion upon "an application of
erroneous legal standards", the Justice replied that the Board "did not
invoke wrong legal standards. It knew well enough the difference between
taxable income and gifts." This counter-assertion does not advance the
argument. Thirdly, the Justice expressed the view that the Board's
conclusion should be upheld for reasons of "wise fiscal as well as judicial
administration." By the term "judicial administration", the Justice may
have meant that it was the peculiar function of the Board to ascertain
reasonable inferences from facts, and, therefore, in, this instance, whether
a gift was intended. But this could be so only if the Board applied
right legal principles-which gets back to the second point. No. elabora-
tion is made of the reference to "wise fiscal . . .administration." Pos-
sibly the Court had in mind the circumstance that the items involved
had been deducted by the taxpayer in the computation of prior years'
income. At any rate, the desirability of the collection of additional
revenue by the Treasury would seem to fall short of a cogent judicial
argument.
The opini6n in the Dental case discloses three elements which invite
analysis: (1) the elimination of the "deduction" approach or "tax bene-
fit" theory, (2) a clarification of the "donative intent" concept, and (3)
the matter of "consideration".
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The "Tax Benefit" Theory
Prior to the Dental case, there had been developed a theory that upon
the cancellation of indebtedness income was realized if the debt, for
example, accrued interest, had been deducted in the taxpayer-debtor's
income tax return for a prior year (the "deduction" approach) or, at
least, if the deduction had offset taxable income (the "tax benefit"
theory). Professor Warren and Mr. Sugarman ° favored the latter as a
"realistic approach to income taxation". To the same effect was Helver-
ing v. Jane Holding Corporation, in which the Court commented:
"The controlling decisions establish that when such items of income are so
entered as accrued debt by a solvent taxpayer returning on the accrual basis,
the items are deemed in law to be restored to income if and when the debt
is subsequently forgiven."' 61
In that case the Circuit Court upheld the Government theory that inter-
est accrued and deducted constituted income when the stockholder-
creditors cancelled the debt. On the same theory, Professor Warren and
Mr. Sugarman6 2 counted as inequitable the Second Circuit opinion in
Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Company, Inc.,' holding that
royalties cancelled by a parent corporation on a cash basis constituted
a nontaxable capital contribution to a subsidiary which had previously
accrued and deducted that amount. Mr. Darrell also thought that "re-
lease from a debt, however incurred, should be treated as income to the
extent that the debt was utilized to offset prior years' income." '
These theories, in so far as they relate to gratuitous forgiveness of
debt, are now outmoded. In Carroll-McCreary Company, Inc. v. Corn-
misswner,5 the Court held that a release by stockholders of debts for
unpaid salaries owed to them was nontaxable income, even though the
corporation had received the benefit of the salary deduction in a prior
year's income tax return. The Dental case specifically dealt with for-
giveness of interest and rent, which not only had been deducted in prior
years' returns, but had been used to offset income in such years. In the
Dental case the Auto Strop decision was approvingly cited.
60. Warren and Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1349.
61. 109 F. (2d) 933 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940), rev'g 38 B.T.A. 960 (1940), cert. denied sub.
nor. Helvering v. Mallinckrodt, 311 U.S. 672 (1940).
62. Warren and Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1348.
63. 74 F. (2d) 226 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934).
64. Darrell, supra note 1, at 982.
65. 124 F. (2d) 303 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
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In Pondfield Realty Company, Inc.,66 another case of a forgiveness of
salary by a stockholder-employee where the salary had accrued and
been deducted by the taxpayer-employer in a prior year, the Tax Court
had held that the forgiveness resulted in taxable income, distinguishing
the Carroll-McCreary case on the ground that the stockholder-employees
in that case had reported the salary as income. The Tax Court did not
believe that if the employees had omitted to return the salary as income,
the Circuit Court "would nevertheless have decided that the forgiveness
was a nontaxable capital contribution". But, on the authority of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Dental case, the Circuit Court,67 on
motion of the parties, reversed and remanded the case to the Tax Court.
In George Hall Corporation," where a holder of less than 2,000 out
of 3,000 shares of the taxpayer-corporation forgave interest in arrears
on its debentures, and the interest had in a prior year been deducted
by the corporation, the forgiveness was first held to represent taxable
income in the year under review on the ground that since the corpora-
tion had deducted the interest when it accrued "and charged its assets
with the burden of the interest debt", it must be taxed when the "burden
was removed by the cancellation". But after the -Dental case, the Tax
Court69 reconsidered and reversed.
Therefore, whatever vitality the tax benefit theory has in other fields,
it appears that in the case of a gratuitously forgiven debt, whether the
subject matter of the gift was deducted in a prior year's return, and,
if deducted, whether it offset taxable income, is without significance. In
these cases, the courts now focus their entire attention on the clear lan-
guage of Code Sec. 22(b) (3) exempting gifts from income taxation.
Nor is it possible to vitiate the effect of the Dental decision by invok-
ing the estoppel doctrine and contending that since the taxpayer claimed
the interest deduction, he is estopped to deny that the forgiveness is
income. This would be an attempt to "create income out of what never
was income either in law or in fact". 70 However, the rule that unpaid
interest, accrued and deducted in the taxpayer's return, is not income
in the year in which gratuitously forgiven does not extend to the allow-
ance of such interest deduction when the accrual and forgiveness occur
within the same taxable year.7'
66. 1 T.C. 217 (1942).
67. Pondfield Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43-2 U.S.T.C. 9600 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
68. 1 T.C. 471 (1943).
69. 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
70. Pancoast Hotel Co., 2 T.C. 362 (1943), A. 1943 C.B. 18.
71. Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 2 T.C. 75 (1943), aff'd on other grounds, - F.
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Donative Intent
Another effect of the Dental case is to require a reappraisal of the
term "donative intent", as applied to gifts within the intendment of
Code Sec. 22(b) (3), and perhaps also under Code Sec. 1000.72
The generally accepted notion of donative intent as applied to debt
adjustment cases was illustrated by Randolph Paul in discussing gift
taxes: 73 "If a creditor cancels a portion of an indebtedness in order to
salvage something, it seems clear 'that donative intent is not at work."
Professor Warren and Mr. Sugarman74 sought to make a distinction
between a gratuitous forgiveness and forgiveness with donative intent.
In a gift tax case which involved a waiver of rights to undeclared divi-
dends on preferred stock, a field closely' related to forgiveness of indebt-
edness, the Board held that action "may be prompted entirely by antici-
pated business benefits which negative a donative intent".75 And in the
Dental case, the Board had found that the creditors "acted for purely
business reasons" and, therefore, by the Board's standard, had not
acted with donative intent.'
A comparison of these statements with those of the Circuit Court
and the Supreme Court in the Dental case, quoted above, leaves no room
for doubt that for the purpose of Code Sec. 22(b) (3) an attempt on the
part of a creditor "to salvage something", or the fact that a creditor, in
scaling down a debt, has an eye to future business or profits, does not
militate against a donative intent. It has been said that under Code
Sec. 22(b)(3), as interpreted in the Dental decision, the requirement
of donative intent has been abandoned. 76 The correctness of this inter-
pretation is doubtful. Donative intent would seem to be required, but
is ipso facto present if the forgiveness is voluntary and gratuitous. "As
long as there was no consideration for the cancellation, the intent to
give necessarily followed." Of the above quoted 'statement from the
(2d) - (C.C.A. 7th, 1944); McConway & Torley Corp., 2 T.C. 593 (1943). The point
involved depends on the rule as to accrual of deductions rather than the rule as to income
from gratuitous forgiveness of debt. But where bonds with coupons attached were ac-
quired by debtor corporation in exchange for a new issue of preferred stock, interest
accrued during the year of exchange is deductible. Here there is no forgiveness, but an
exchange of bonds and coupons for a single consideration-stock. Hummel-Ross Fibre Co.,
40 B.T.A. 821 (1939).
72. The gift tax phase of the matter is considered infra at pp. 167-168.
73. PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE =D Gm" TAXATION (1942) 1092.
74. Warren and Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1366.
75. Emily Coles Collins, 1 T.C. 605 (1943), N.A. 1943 C.B. 29.
76. (1944) 44 CoL. L. REv. 102, 105. '
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Circuit Court opinion in the Dental case, Circuit Judge Goodrich, in
Sportwear Hosier Mills v. Commissioner," said:
"If this language means that in every instance where a payment is made
without consideration the conclusion necessarily follows that a gift has been
made, it goes considerably beyond what has previously been thought to be
the law."
In view of the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Circuit Court decision
in the Dental case, and on precisely the same ground as that on whicfi
the Circuit Court-relied, it is not unfair to state that, although it does
go considerably beyond what has previously been thought to be the law,
in every instance where an indebtedness is voluntarily forgiven without
consideration--"a release of something to the debtor for nothing"-a
gift has been made within the purview of Code Sec. 22(b)(3).11 Of
course, where there are no direct negotiations between the debtor and
the creditor, as in the Fifth Avenue-14th Street case, 9 in which the
taxpayer-mortgagor dealt with the mortgage certificate holders whose
rights were enforceable only thofigh the trust company mortgagee, there
was no room for the "donative intent" theory and, accordingly, income
was held to be realized.
Consideration
It has been fairly stated that there "is always a reason for a gift",
but that any "reason, not amounting to legal consideration, is not mate-
rial."80 In the Dental case, there was no quid pro quo,' but the Circuit
77. 129 F. (2d) 376 (C.C.A. 3d, 1942).
78. In F. W. Leadbetter, T.C. Memo. Op., Dkts., 110,258, 110,259 (August 13, 1943),
the Tax Court ruled that the excess of a debt due a corporation from its stockholder over
the value of property transferred by the stockholder in settlement was taxable income to
the stockholder, but ]iere the creditor wai a personal holding corporation controlled by
the debtor, and the corporation's act could not fairly be construed as a voluntary for-
giveness of part of the debt.
79. 2 T.C. 516 (1943). Likewise, in Bulkley Building Company, T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt.
109, 679 (October 25, 1944), the Tax Court held that upon the acquisition by a corpora-
tion of its own obligations at a discount, income realized with respect to obligations ac-
quired directly from the holders through acceptance of invitations of tender was exempt
under the Dental rule, but that as to bonds acquired in the market the transactions
lacked the personal element necessary to constitute a gift, within the meaning of the Dental
case, and, accordingly, that income thereby realized was taxable under the Kirby rule, as
applied in the Fifth Avenue-14th Street case.
80. Cem Securities Corporation v. United States, 55 Fed. Supp. 109 (Ct. Cls. 1944).
81. Debt adjustments made by a business corporation with its debtors may maintain
good will. The Dental'decision has been criticized for requiring strict legal consideration,
and it has been said that "in applying a statute which is to determine the net income of
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Court pointed out that with a slight variation the transaction might have
been for a consideration rendering the forgiveness taxable. If, said the
Court, the landlord had said: " 'If you will make a new lease, I will
reduce your indebtedness to $7,500,' the making of the new lease might
have constituted consideration for the promise to forgive."
In one recent case82 the Dental rule may have been stretched beyond its
limits. The due date of certain notes of the taxpayer had been extended
by the bank which held them, and the bank had thereafter agreed, in con-
sideration of immediate payment, to accept some $8,000 less than the
amount due. Citing the Dental decision, the Tax Court held that no in-
come was realized. Here it would appear that the prepayment of the note
did constitute a consideration, and that, therefore, there was no gratuitous
forgiveness. On the other hand, in order to take a case outside the Dental
rule because of the presence of consideration, it' is necessary that the
consideration pass from the debtor to the creditor. Thus, a forgiveness,
by a parent corporation of a debt due from a subsidiary, the parent hav-
ing agreed with its own creditor to forgive the subsidiary's debt in order
that the latter might pay the parent a dividend out of the proceeds of
which the parent would pay its own debt, is not debt cancellation for
consideration, since, as between the parent and the subsidiary there
was no consideration and the matters between the parent and its credi-
tors leading to the cancellation were "motives" and, under the Dental
case, not significant.8
A forgiveness of corporate debt by a stockholder-creditor is without
consideration if made to put the corporation on a sound financial foot-
ing,"4 or to relieve the corporation of a strained financial condition,8"
or to facilitate a loan to the corporation."6 From these and other cases
already cited, it is clear that the courts have no hesitancy in treating as
within the rationale of the Dental case forgiveness of indebtedness by
stockholders. In these instances, such forgiveness is regarded as a
voluntary transfer without consideration, a gift. In one case,"7 the
Tax Court said it felt bound as a legal proposition, on the authority
a business corporation" a less legalistic definition should have been applied. (1943) 12
FoRann.rm L. REv. 198, 201.
82. Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 2 T.C. 75 (1943), aff'd, - F. - (2d) (C.C.A.
7th, 1944).
83. McConway & Torley Corp., 2 T.C. 593 (1943).
84. S. H. DeRoy & Co., T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 109,581 (May 9, 1944).
,85. George Hall Corporation, 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
86. Tanner Mfg. Co., T.C. Memo Op., Dkt. 110,068 (June 19, 1943).
87. George Hall Corporation, 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
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of the Dental decision, to hold that a debt forgiveness by a debenture-
holder, who was also a large stockholder, was a gift, and, therefore, not
taxable income of the debtor corporation, adding: "The fact that the
regulations may give ground for calling it also a contribution of capital
. . does not affect the decision." The soundness of the view that a con-
tribution to capital constitutes a gift may be questioned. Assume a
solvent corporation with a single class of stock outstanding. By a trans-
fer of assets, or a forgiveness of debt, a stockholder increases the net
corporate assets, but receives no additional shares of stock. Has he not,
by virtue of his stockholder relationship, received a consideration?
After the transaction he may be neither richer nor poorer. In substance
he may have given away nothing. Only to the extent that he has trans-
ferred assets or forgiven debts out of proportion to his stock interest
may he be said in a real sens& to have made a gratuitous transfer or to
have effected a gratuitous forgiveness. This is not to say that a for-
giveness of debt by a stockholder creates corporate income. To the
extent'to which the forgiven debt is in proportion to his stock interest
the stockholder has made an investment, not a gift. And from the stand-
point of the debtor corporation the forgiveness is a capital transaction
whereby the corporation realizes no taxable income. To the extent to
which the forgiven debt is in excess of his proportionate stock interest,
the stockholder has made a gift, and, under the Dental decision, the cor-
poration has realized no taxable income. But whether it be a contribution
to capital or a gift, or both, a forgiveness of debt by a stockholder gives
rise to no income and it would seem to be in order for the Treasury
Department, which, following the Board's decision in the Jane Holding
Corporation case, added the phrase, "to the extent of the principal of.
the debt", to the previous regulation, so as to make it read:
"In general, if a shareholder in a corporation which is indebted to him gratui-
tously forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contribution to the
capital of the corporation to the extent of the principal of the debt",88
to delete the addition.
Burden of Proof
Where the Commissioner determines that a taxpayer has realized in-
come through the reduction or cancellation of indebtedness, such holding
carries with it a presumption of correctness, and reliance upon the
Dedtal decision is fruitless unless the taxpayer adduces evidence that
88. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-13; Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-14; Reg. 101, Art. 22(a)-14. Cf.
Reg. 94, Art. 22(a)-14.
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the reduction or cancellation was voluntary and gratuitous. A mere
showing that interest was cancelled, with no evidence that the cancella-
tion was voluntary and gratuitous, is not a sufficient basis for excluding.
such income.89
Forgiveness from Standpoint of Creditor
From the standpoint of the creditor, both the income tax aspect and
the gift tax aspect of debt cancellation require consideration.
Does a creditor on a cash-receipts basis, to whom amounts are owed
representing salary due in prior years realize income in the process of
forgiving such indebtedness? By an application of the doctrine of the
Dental case, combined with that of the Horst case,9° the Commissioner
so contended in John Harvey Kellogg." The gist of hig ingenious argu-
ment was that the gratuitous forgiveness of a debt is a gift (the Dental
doctrine), that a gift presupposes something to give, in this instance
past-due salary, that one who has a right to income may realize it through
the enjoyment of transferring it (the Horst doctrine), and that, there-
fore, one entitled to such salary payments may realize income through
the exercise of the privilege of surrendering the right thereto. To state
the argument more simply, the waiver of the salary constituted a con-
structive receipt and a simultaneous surrender. The Tax Court was
unwilling to extend the Horst doctrine to that length, and, finding a
"prohibitive difficulty in keeping the condeption within rational limits",
reversed the Commissioner's determination. The latter's acquiescence 2
indicates his abandonment of that approach.
Another income tax implication from the standpoint of the creditor
is suggested by the Dental case. May a creditor, under Code Sec. 23 (k),
claim a bad debt deduction for a debt or a portion thereof which he
has grauitously forgiven? If it were worthless when he made the gift,
it would seem that he would be entitled to the deduction, but it would
likewise seem that if a portion of the debt were gratuitously forgiven,
the deduction with respect to that portion could not be postponed until
a subsequent year when the debt was liquidated. At that time as to
that portion there was no debt. The creditor had already disposed of it.
Where a creditor accepts a compromise settlement of a note evidencing
a business debt, it is of importance that the record show that he is
89. Elizabeth Operating Corp., T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 112,709 (September 23, 1943).
90. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 Sup. Ct. 144 (1940).
91. 2 T.C. 1126 (1943). -
92. A. I.R.B. 1944-6, 1.
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dealing with the debtor or an agent of the debtor, and not with a third
party; otherwise, he may be faced with the claim that the transaction
was the sale of a capital asset 'subject to the applicable statutory
limitations.
3
More troublesome is the gift tax question. To the extent that a debt,
when forgiven, is without value, the gift tax problem becomes academic,
but the .debtor in these situations, although normally in financial straits,
is not always without assets, e.g., the debtor in the Dental case. If, with-
out consideration, a creditor forgives a debt, there is, as established in
the Dental decision, a gift to the debtor under, Code Sec. 22(b)(3),
which provides for the exclusion from gross income and the exemption
from income taxation of the "value of property acquired by gift". At
the same time, there arises the question of tax liability of the creditor
under Code Sec. 1000, which imposes a gift tax upon the transfer by an
individual "of property by gift". Again, if a creditor cancels a debt
for an inadequate consideration, then, since Code'Sec. 1002 provides
that a transfer for "less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth" is deemed to be a gift, there arises a question as to
whether the creditor may not be subject to gift tax, even though the
debtor, there being no gratuitous forgiveness, is subject to income taxa-
tion with respect to the same item.
Prior to 1934, the Income Tax Regulations provided:
"If . . .a creditor merely desires to benefit a debtor and without any con-
sideration therefor cancels the debt, the amount of the debt is a gift from
the creditor to the debtor and need not be included in the latter's gross
income." 94
Since, at the same time, the Gift Tax Regulations95 provided that a
taxable transfer might result from "the forgiving-of a debt", it 'was
thought that there was "confusion in the Regulations"96 and that the
elimination of the above quoted provision in the Income Tax Regula-
tions ended the confusion. But the Dental decision has gone even fur-
ther than effectually restoring the Regulation. In the light of the Dental
case, the eliminated provision was the source of confusion, not because
it provided that a forgiven debt might be a gift, but, rather, because it
provided that it might be a gift only if the creditor "merely desires to
93. George A. Adam, T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1720 (June 28, 1944).
94. Reg. 77, Art. 64 (1932).
95. Reg. 79, Art. 2.
96. Warren and Sugarman, supra note 1, at 1363.
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benefit a debtor". The presence or absence of that desire is, under the
Dental case, of no consequence.
Prior to the decision of the Circuit Court in the Dental case, it was
suggested that to constitute a taxable gift, a discharge of indebtedness
must be one accompanied by "an intent to benefit the debtor, or dona-
tive intent."9 In view of the new definition contained in that decision,
further elaboration of the foregoing phrase is required.
The term "gift" is used both in Code Sec. 22(b)(3) and in Code
Sec. 1000, but it does not follow that a transaction which is a gift under
the one section is also a gift under the other. As was said by the Supreme
Court in the Dental case, "'Gifts', however, is a generic word of broad
connotation, taking coloration from the context of the particular statute
in which it may appear." A forgiveness of debt, therefore, might be a
"gift" under Code Sec. 22(b) (3), for the purpose of .exempting the
debtor from income tax, but not a "gift" under Code Sec. 1000, for the
purpose of imposing a gift tax upon the creditor.9 8 "Possibly because
it seems beyond the legislative purpose to exact income taxes for sav-
ings on debts",99 the courts have been quite circumspect in dealing with
debt adjustment cases in relation to income taxes. Would it not seem
that possibly it was also the legislative purpose not to exact gift taxes
from creditors upon the gratuitous forgiveness of debts when such action
is designed primarily to benefit the creditor, and that the courts would
be equally astute in regard to gift taxes? In determining the "colora-
tion" to be assigned to the term for the purpose of gift taxes, a further
factor to be weighed is that the gift tax provisions supplement the estate
tax provisions, and that since in the nature of things a forgiveness of
debt primarily for the purpose of benefiting the creditor would not
normally occur in estate taxation, it was not intended to be brought
within the ambit of the gift tax provisions. In any event, it would
seem that the courts would be quite averse to imposing a gift tax on
a forgiveness of indebtedness if the predominant design was economically
to benefit the creditor, albeit the forgiveness also benefited the debtor.
But the problem remains, and as yet there is neither Treasury ruling
nor court decision to guide the taxpayer.
97. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXAION (1942) 1092.
98. In I.T. 3329, 1939-2 C.B. 153, the Bureau ruled that payments voluntarily made
by a corporation to the widow of a deceased officer were deductible expenses to the
corporation but nontaxable gifts to the widow.
99. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 327, 63 Sup. Ct. 577, 580 (1943).
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ExCESS PROFITS TAX CONSIDERATIONS
The discharge or forgiveness of indebtedness also has its peculiar
place under the excess profits tax provisions of the Code. The abnormal
character of such income, if the indebtedness is represented by a bond
or other evidence of debt, and if the taxpayer's obligation has been
outstanding for more than six months, is recognized in the provisions
whereunder such income is excluded in the calculation of excess profits
net income for the taxable year, whether computed for the purpose of
the income credit'01 or the invested capital credit,'0 ' ,and in the calcu-
lation of the excess profits net income for the base period.' Also
excluded in the calculation of excess profits net income for the base
period are certain deductions in relation to the discharge of indebted-
ness, if represented by a bond or other evidence of debt, and if the obli-
gation of the taxpayer has been outstanding for more than eighteen
months. 13 Thus, although consistency would require, that if, in respect
of the taxable period and the base period, profits on the discharge of
obligations outstanding over six months are not included as income,
losses on such discharges should likewise not be included as 'deductions,
Congress has been somewhat indulgent in making no provision in respect
of the taxable period for exclusion of any losses on the discharge of
obligations, and, while not going as far in respect of the base period as
to provide for exclusion of losses on discharge of obligations if out-
standing for more than six months (which would be consistent with the
provision for exclusion in the base period of profits on the-discharge
of obligations outstanding over six months), has provided, in respect of
the base period, for the exclusion of losses on the discharge of obliga-
tions outstanding for more than eighteen months.
A forgiven debt may also be a factor in the calculation of invested
capital. In one case which recently came before the Tax Court0 the
creditors of a corporation, none of whom were stockholders, except one
who was the record holder of a single share, voluntarily cancelled debts
due them. The question was whether the amount of the forgiven debts
could be treated as equity invested capital, which is defined'05 to include:
"Property . ..previously paid in . ..for stock, or as paid-in surplus,
100. I.R.C. § 711(a) (1) (C), 56 STAT. 902-904, 26 U.S.C.A. § 711(a) (1) (C) (1942).
101. I.R.C. § 711(a) (2) (E), 56 STAT. 902-904, 26 U.S.C.A. § 711(a) (2) (E) (1942).
102. I.R.C. § 711(b)(1)(C), 56 STAT. 902-904, 26 U.S.C.A. § 711(b)(1)(C) (1942).
103. I.R.C. § 711(b) (1) (D), 56 STAT. 902-904, 26 U.S.C.A. § 711(b) (1) (D) (1942).
104. Liberty Mirror Works, 3 T.C.-No. 126 (1944).
105. I.R.C. § 718(a)(2), 56 STAT. 902, 26 U.S.C.A. § 718(a)(2) (1942).
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or as a contribution to capital." The Court ruled that none of the for-
given debts could be treated as equity invested capital. The decision
has been construed to mean that debts forgiven by non-stockholders
cannot be considered as either paid-in surplus or contributions to capi-
tal, and has been criticized as not entirely convincing.106 The holding
of the Court is not quite as broad as to state that under no circum-
stances are debts forgiven by non-stockholder creditors to be treated
as invested capital. What the Court said was that it did not think that
"the gratuitous forgiveness of a corporation's debts b non-stockholder
creditors necessarily results in a contribution to capital. . . ." In this
case, the forgiven debts included amounts owing to merchandise credi-
tors and amounts owing to banks on account of advances for working
capital. When a merchandise creditor partially cancels his debt, whether
as to principal or interest, or both, the transaction takes on more the
aspect of a reduction of sales price of the merchandise than that pf a
contribution to capital, and hence the amount cancelled would not seem
a proper element in the computation of invested capital. More doubtful
is the status of forgiven bank debt which represented advances for
working capital. It would seem that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down as to whether forgiveness of indebtedness by non-stockholders
does or does not represent contributions to capital, but that each case
must be decided on its own facts.
SPECIFIC STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The general rule that income is realized in the discharge of indebted-
ness by payment of an amount less than the amount borrowed or as-
sumed is subject to further exceptions contained in the Chandler Act
as amended in 194017 and as restricted by the Revenue Act of 19421
and the Revenue Act of 1943;'09 by Code Sec. 22(b)(9) as added by
the Revenue Act of 1939110 and amended by the Revenue Act of
1942;"'l and by Code Sec. 22(b) (10) as added by the Revenue Act of
1942.11 These provisions reflect repeated Congressional attempts to
meet the demands of importunate corporate taxpayers for relief from
106. Prentice-Hall (1944) Fed. Tax Guide 111054; 444 C.C.H. 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. 113590.
107. Pub. L. No. 699, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (July 1, 1940).
108. Rev. Act of 1942, § 142.
109. Rev. Act of 1943, §§ 121, 122.
110. Rev. Act of 1939, § 215.
111. Rev. Act of 1942 § 114.
112. Ibid.
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taxation in transactions resulting- in debt adjustments,, coupled with
Congressional apprehension lest the relief granted result in an undue
advantage to taxpayers. The conventional trial-and-error method has
been followed. The product is a melange of legislation. While it is not
possible within the limits of this article to review these provisions in
detail, a few observations may be made.
Obviously, the most appropriate place for statutory provisions relat-
ing to income taxation is in the Internal Revenue Code. No reason is
apparent why the applicable provisions of Sec. 268 of the Chandler Act,
providing for exclusions from income of amounts attributable to the
discharge of indebtedness, or the related provisions of Sec. 270 thereof,
providing for reduction of tax basis by the amount by which certain
indebtedness has been reduced, should not be part and parcel of the
Internal Revenue Code, or at least incorporated therein by reference.
The point should not be overstated, but is rather emphasized by the
Code provisions 3 which recite conditions under which the provisions
of Sec. 270 of the Chandler Act shall'not be effective.
By the provisions of Sec. 270, the basis of a debtor's property is re-
duced by the amount of certain debt cancelled in a 77B reorganization.
Code Sec. 113(b) (4), relating to adjusted 'basis of property, provides
that when a debt adjustment plan is consummated in a 77B proceeding
and the final decree is entered before September 22, 1938 (the effective
date of the Chandler Act), and there is no transfer of assets to another
corporation, Sec. 270 shall not apply. Code Sec. 113(a)(22) provides
that if the 77B reorganization is one which qualifies under Code Sec.
112(b)(10), or so much of Code Sec. 112(d) or (e) as relates to Code
Sec. 112(b)(10), then Sec. 270 of the Chandler Act shall not apply.
Code Sec. 113(a)(22) contemplates acquisition of assets by a new
corporation, and is applicable whether the final decree was entered either
before or after September 22, 1938. 'The net result of the foregoing
is that if in a 77B proceeding a new corporation is organized, and for
its property issues solely stock and securities (Code Sec. 112 (b) (10)),
or stock and securities plus "boot" (Code Sec. 112(d) or (e)), there
is no reduction of basis by reason of debt adjustment, and if a corpora-
tion reorganized in a 77B proceeding continues in existence and the final
decree was entered before September 22, 1938, there is also no reduction
of basis by reason of the debt adjustment, while if the old corporation
is so reorganized and continues in existence but the final decree is
113. See I.R.C. § 113(a)(22), 56 STAT. 812, 26 U.S.C.A. § 113(a)(22) (1941).
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entered after September 272, 1938, Sec. 270 does apply and there is a
reduction of basis by reason of debt adjustment. There does not seem
to be any satisfactory explanation of the requirement for a reduction of
basis by reason of debt adjustment where the old corporation continues
in existence, and no such reduction where a new corporation is organized.
No model of draftsmanship is to be found in the tax provisions of
the Chandler Act." 4 The most glaring defect in Sec. 270 as originally
enacted was remedied by the amendment of 1940, which supplied a floor
by which the reduction of basis of assets was limited to their fair market
value. But the scope of application of the section remained obscure. In
a case involving a transferee of assets of a corporation in reorganization
under Sec. 77B, the Board".. held that Sec. 270 was prospective only,
and did not require a reduction of basis for taxable years ending prior
to September 22, 1938. The Circuit Court affirmed.1 ' The Seventh
Circuit,1 1 7 on the other hand, reversing the Tax Court, n8 held that Sec.
270 also applied retroactively, and in a transaction involving a 77B
proceeding, did require a reduction of basis for such prior years, al-
though the 77B proceeding was confirmed prior to September 22, 1938.
In view of the conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."9 The
latter has now decided that neither of the foregoing views was correct
and that in a 77B proceeding, Sec. 270 applied only to a proceeding
pending on Septefnber- 22, 1938.120 Meanwhile, the legislation has
been further patched by the Revenue Act of 1943. As added by that
act, Code Sec. 113(b) (4) (making Sec. 270 inoperative in certain cases)
is deemed to be applicable to years beginning after December 31, 1935,
while Code Sec.' 113(a) (22) (making Sec. 270 inoperative in other cases)
is effective with respect to years beginning after December 31, 1933, but
not affecting tax liability for any year beginning prior to January 1, 1943.
Sec. 270 presents" further complications. If stock is issued for bonds,
ahd the par value of the stock equals, but its market value is less than,
the issue price of the bonds, two questions are presented: whether, for
the purpose of determining if indebtedness has been reduced, the market
value of the stock should be compared with the issue price of the bonds,
114. Paul, Debt and Basis Reduction Under the Chandler Act (1940) 15 Tu.NE L.
REV. 1.
115. The Commodore, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 718 (1942).
116. Commissioner v. The Commodore, Inc., 135 F. (2d) 89 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943).
117. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F. (2d) 962 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
118. Claridge Apartments Co., I T.C. 163 (1942).
119. 321 U.S. 759.
120. - U.S. - (December 4, 1944).
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and, if so, whether the exchange has effected a reduction of indebtedness.
As to the first point, it would seem that the correct comparatives are
market value of stock and issue price of bonds. On the second point,
the Tax Court held that there was no "true reduction or cancellation of
the original indebtedness, but what amounts'to a continuation of it in
another form".' 2 ' The Circuit Court 22 rejected this view and held that
the stock "wiped out a direct debt liability".
It may also be noted that Code Sec. 22 (b) (9) affords relief only to
a corporate taxpayer, and that no provision has been made for an indi-
vidual taxpayer; that Code Sec. 22(b) (9) applies only in respect of
certain types of indebtedness, but neither Code Sec. 22 (b) (10), relating
to certain railroads, nor Sec. 268 of the Chandler Act, relating to certain
insolvent corporations, is so limited; that Code Sections 22 (b) (9) and
113(b)(3) require an adjustment of basis of assets, as does also Sec.
268 of the Chandler Act, while Code Sec. 22(b)(10) requires no such
adjustment; that Code Sec. 113(b) (3) provides no limit on the extent
of a basis-adjustment, while Sec. 270 of the Chandler Act now includes
a "fair market value" limitation; that Code Sec. 22(b) (9) furnishes the
taxpayer with an option, while Sec. 268 of the Chandler Act is man-
datory, and that Code Sections 22 (b) (9) and 22 (b) (10) are in the form
of temporary legislation, while the Chandler Act is permanent.
In the event that a taxpayer wishes to contend that a debt reduction
did not give rise to taxable income, e.g., on the ground that taxpayer
was insolvent after the transaction, and was thus within the Dallas rule,
or on the ground that the transaction constituted a gift under the Dental
rule, and alternatively to claim a right of election to exclude the income
under Code Sec. 22(b)(9), a practical difficulty arises. The Treasury
Department Regulations" make no provision for a qualified consent
to adjustment of basis. In the Bulkley Building Company case, 24 the
taxpayer had made such an election by filing its consent to adjustment
of basis. In an effort to avoid such adjustment, but without actually
withdrawing its consent, the taxpayer contended before the Tax Court
that the income was nontaxable under the Dental rule. The allowance
of the taxpayer's claim under Code Sec. 22(b)(9) eliminated any
deficiency for the year. The Court pointed out that the taxpayer had
not withdrawn its consent, and, without deciding whether the election'
121. Claridge Apartments Co., 1 T.C. 163, 173 (1942).
122. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F. (2d) 962 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
123. Reg. 111, § 29.22(b)(9)-2.
124. T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 109,679 (October 25, 1944).
1
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might have been withdrawn, declined to pass upon the question as to
whether the Dental rule could be invoked. It would seem that the
Treasury Department should amend its regulations to provide for a
qualified consent.
CONCLUSION
Two closing observations may be made. Each court decision which
has since become a landmark in this field met, initially at least, with
considerable adverse legal criticism. This was so of the Kelbaugh-
Empire case, .establishing the theory that no income, is realized in the
settlement of indebtedness for less than the amount borrowed where
the borrowed funds have been lost; it was so of the Dallas case, estab-
lishing the theory that no income is realized through debt cancellation
if the debtor continues insolvent; it was so of the Hirsch case, establish-
ing the theory that no income is realized from debt cancellation if it
effects a reduction of purchase price, and, finally, it was so of the
decision in the Dental case that no income is realized from the voluntary
gratuitous forgiveness of debt. If limited to the foregoing propositions,
none of these cases appears to be unsound. On the contrary, along with
the Kirby decision, they presently furnish the only substantial basis
for the development of further judicial law on this subject. Legislation
is" another matter. In the Chandler Act, Congress made a well-inten-
tioned but poorly executed attempt at relief, and has not yet caught up
with all the dqficiences of that statute. By their terms, the present relief
provisions of the Code will shortly expire. If it be the policy of Con-
gress to grant a measure of tax relief in debt adjustment situations, it
would seem that all applicable provisions, including those of the Chandler
Act, should be brought within the framework of the Internal Revenue
Code, and that an effort should be made to achieve more uniformity of
treatment and closer coordination of the various provisions.
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